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Abstract
The discursive construction of a populist divide between the ‘good’ people and ‘corrupt’ elites can conceptually be linked
to disinformation. More specifically, (right-wing) populists are not only attributing blame to the political elites, but increas-
ingly vent anti-media sentiments in which the mainstream press is scapegoated for not representing the people. In an era
of post-truth relativism, ‘fake news’ is increasingly politicized and used as a label to delegitimize political opponents or
the press. To better understand the affinity between disinformation and populism, this article conceptualizes two relation-
ships between these concepts: (1) blame attributions to the dishonest media as part of the corrupt elites that mislead the
people; and (2) the expression of populist boundaries in a people-centric, anti-expert, and evidence-free way. The results
of a comparative qualitative content analysis in the US and Netherlands indicate that the political leaders Donald Trump
and Geert Wilders blame legacy media in populist ways by regarding them as part of the corrupt and lying establishment.
Compared to left-wing populist and mainstream politicians, these politicians are the most central players in the discursive
construction of populist disinformation. Both politicians bypassed empirical evidence and expert knowledge whilst priori-
tizing the people’s truth and common sense at the center stage of honesty and reality. These expressions resonated with
public opinion on Facebook, although citizens were more likely to frame mis- and disinformation in terms of ideological
cleavages. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the role of populist discourse in a post-
factual era.
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1. Introduction
Populism and the uncontrolled spread of mis- and dis-
information have been regarded as key threats to the
functioning of representative democracy. Although pop-
ulism and mis- and disinformation have been studied
within separate research fields, we can identify an im-
portant conceptual affinity between these concepts (e.g.,
Waisbord, 2018). First of all, populism’s antagonistic
framing of the ordinary people versus the corrupt elites
can be extrapolated to the attribution of blame to alleged
inaccurate and dishonest media elites. Second, populism
typically focuses on conflict and the people’s feelings and
experiences whilst circumventing or attacking empirical
evidence and expert analyses. Although this does not
mean that populism should be equated with the politics
of disinformation, it does indicate that the central stylis-
tic and framing elements of populism can give rise to a
type of argumentation in which people-centric experi-
ences are preferred over expert knowledge and empiri-
cal evidence.
Populist communication and mis- and disinforma-
tion may have similar political consequences. By shifting
blame to the alleged ‘corrupt’ elites whilst emphasizing
the centrality of the ordinary people, populist commu-
nication may polarize the electorate—cultivating an in-
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group of deprived people against other groups in soci-
ety (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017; Müller et al.,
2017). Literature on the political consequences of mis-
and disinformation posits that people may be inclined to
accept information that aligns with their partisan lenses,
whereas they avoid or counterargue dissonant informa-
tion (Thorson, 2016). As a consequence of such defen-
sive motivations, polarization between opposing camps
may be bolstered, placing people in fact-free populist
echo chambers. In this article, we extend the conceptu-
alization of the interconnectedness of populism and mis-
and disinformation beyond their shared political conse-
quences by focusing on two types of discursive relation-
ships: (1) scapegoating the media as part of a populist
communication strategy; and (2) populist disinformation
as a discursive construction of fact-free, anti-elitist, and
people-centric discourse. We rely on a qualitative con-
tent analysis of social media data collected in the US and
the Netherlands to empirically explore the presence of
these relationships. The central two-fold research ques-
tion guiding this study is: (1) How are the media blamed
for being dishonest and inaccurate; and (2) how are pop-
ulist expressions related to a fact-free discourse?
Different actors in media, politics and society can di-
rectly spread (dis)information without the interference
of media elites or journalistic routines, such as verifica-
tion, accuracy and balance. Citizens can, for example, use
social media to share their distrust in the media and
politics, irrespective of the factual basis of their claims.
Politicians may also use the oxygen of publicity provided
by ungated social media to spread falsehoods across
society. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Donald
Trump in the US are two influential cases to consider
in this regard: They are found to frequently blame the
media for spreading lies that harm the ordinary people.
Together, this article analyzes the discursive construction
of populist disinformation by citizens and leading politi-
cians in the US and the Netherlands. These countries
are selected to compare how the discursive relationship
between populism and disinformation is constructed in
‘most different’ media and political systems (e.g., Hallin
& Mancini, 2004). Hence, the US has a bi-partisan politi-
cal setting—which is mirrored in the ideological leaning
of the press. The Netherlands, in contrast, is governed
by amultipartyminority government, and the opposition
consists of (smaller) left- and right-wing parties. Although
some media outlets may have an ideological color, the
Dutch press is less divided by ideological/partisan per-
spectives. In this setting, we aim to assess how robust
and context-independent the discursive construction be-
tween populism and mis- and disinformation is.
The key findings of the qualitative content analy-
sis indicate that both Trump in the US and Wilders in
the Netherlands use social media to express their dis-
trust in established institutions. These sentiments res-
onate with hostile media perceptions on the demand-
side of the electorate. Ordinary citizens use Facebook
communities to express their closeness to the ordinary,
honest people who share similar constructions of real-
ity. Moreover, they mark their distance to lying elites
and dishonest media outlets. These constructions are
not voiced by mainstream or left-wing populist politi-
cians, who express milder media criticisms that aremore
closely linked to misinformation attributions. These find-
ings implicate that the discursive construction of pop-
ulism and mis- and disinformation can be integrated on
social network sites, where both politicians and ordi-
nary people shape alternative versions of ‘their’ reality
whilst discrediting the ‘truths’ disseminated by their op-
ponents. An important theoretical implication is that con-
structions of ‘truth’ and ‘fake’ are driven by identity at-
tachments and motivated reasoning rather than a delib-
eration of all available facts—augmenting polarized di-
vides across society.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Populist Discourse and the Attribution of Blame to
the Media
Populism revolves around the expression of a central
divide in politics and society—the ordinary people are
pitted against the ‘corrupt’ elites (e.g., Albertazzi &
McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004; Mudde
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). As populism emphasizes that
the ordinary people are not represented by the ‘cor-
rupt’ and self-interested elites, populism relates to attri-
butions of blame (Hameleers et al., 2017). More specifi-
cally, problems experienced by the ordinary people are
allegedly caused by elites that are unwilling and unable
to represent their ‘own’ people. Here, it is relevant to
distinguish the ideational core of populism from host
ideologies that may be associated with populism (also
see Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).
Essentially, populism refers to a style, communication
tactic, discourse, or (thin) ideology in which the ordinary
people are framed in opposition to the corrupt elites.
This core idea can be enriched with host ideologies—
such as nativism and anti-immigration sentiments on the
right-wing and economic inclusion or anti-capitalism on
the left-wing.
In this article, a communication approach to pop-
ulism is taken (also see Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann,
Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Jagers &Walgrave, 2007).
More specifically, populist ideas come into being—and
have real-life political consequences—when communica-
tors (i.e., politicians, the media, citizens) emphasize pop-
ulist ideas in their communication. Although a growing
number of empirical studies are based on content ana-
lytic research on the expression of populist ideas in (on-
line) media (e.g., Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser, 2019;
Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019; Waisbord & Amado, 2017),
there is relatively little inductive research on the nature
of populist discourse (but see e.g., Engesser, Ernst, Esser,
& Büchel, 2017; Hameleers, 2019). Qualitative research
indicates that populist ideas are frequently present in a
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 146–157 147
fragmented way in the media—indicating that the dif-
ferent components of populist communication do not
always co-occur as single frames or interpretations in
texts (Engesser et al., 2017). Extending this research,
this article aims to explore how the central building
blocks of populist discourse are represented in texts com-
municated by politicians and citizens, and how the ex-
pression of (fragments of) populist discourse resonate
with the attribution of communicative untruthfulness or
‘fake news.’
Misinformation can simply be defined as inaccurate
or false information that is spread without the intention
to mislead (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Wardle, 2017).
Disinformation can be defined as the intentional (multi-
modal) doctoring, manipulation, or de-contextualization
to reach a certain goal (e.g., Marwick & Lewis, 2017;
Wardle, 2017). Although mis- and disinformation are dif-
ferent from populist communication, we can identify a
discursive connection between the attribution of mis-
and disinformation and the ideational core of populist
blameattributions (i.e., using ‘fake news’ as a delegitimiz-
ing label or accusing politicians of spreading falsehoods).
More specifically, populism’s Manichean discourse by-
passes elitist knowledge and expert opinion and stresses
conflict, emotionalization and people centrism.
Populism’s antagonistic view on society and poli-
tics has been associated with anti-media sentiments
(e.g., Krämer, 2017). Hence, established media outlets
can be regarded as part of the ‘corrupt’ establishment
far-removed from the people’s experiences. Populism’s
blame attribution strategy may thus apply to the attri-
bution of causal responsibility to the media elite as well.
Against this backdrop, we first of all identify a relation-
ship between populist rhetoric and attributions of mis-
and disinformation: Next to shifting blame to political
elites, populist communication can shift blame to the es-
tablished press or media elites for not representing the
ordinary people’s worldview (misinformation) or for de-
liberately lying to them (disinformation).
Although populism emphasizes a pervasive causal
and moral divide between the ordinary people and the
corrupt elites, most research has applied a rather limited
conceptualization of the elites. Hence, the political elites
on the national or supra-national are not the only eli-
tist actors deemed responsible for causing the people’s
problems. By allegedly silencing the people’s voice, and
by promoting versions of reality that support the estab-
lished political order, the mainstream media can be re-
garded as an important enemy of the people in populist
discourse (e.g., Fawzi, 2019). We therefore need to ex-
tend our understanding of populist communication and
shift our focus to the media elites and journalists as part
of the people’s enemy. As a first step, we thus concep-
tualize attributions of mis- and disinformation within a
populist framework: Populism’s antagonistic framing of a
central opposition between ordinary and honest people
and lying and corrupt elites may be extrapolated to me-
dia critique and hostility. Just like the political elites are
held responsible for depriving the ordinary people, the
media can be blamed for lying to the people, and deliber-
ately misleading them by communicating misleading in-
terpretations that suit their own political agenda.
Different actors can express populist and anti-media
sentiments through different media channels. In line
with the recent body of research on the content and ef-
fects of online populist communication (e.g., Engesser
et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2019), this article focuses on the
communication of populist ideas via social media plat-
forms. Although most empirical research has focused on
the direct communication of populist ideas by (populist)
actors (Engesser et al., 2017), online media may also cre-
ate a discursive platform for ordinary citizens to com-
municate populist ideas (Hameleers, 2019). Combining
these approaches, this article aims to understand how
politicians and members of the ‘ordinary’ people use so-
cial network sites to express populist boundaries that
blame themedia for the people’s problems. On the actor
level, we are mostly interested in how radical-right wing
populist actors that have theoretically been associated
with the spread of disinformation (Bennett & Livingston,
2018; Marwick & Lewis, 2017) attribute blame to the
media by accusing them of disinformation. However, al-
though conceptual literature has regarded the disinfor-
mation order as a radical-right wing phenomenon, it re-
mains an open question if, and if so how, the affinity be-
tween the ideational core of populism and discourses of
(un)truthfulness or the radical right-wing component is
the driving force of attributions of blame to the media.
For this reason, we will contrast conceptually most likely
cases of media scapegoating (Trump and Wilders as rad-
ical right-wing populists) to other cases (left-wing pop-
ulists and mainstream politicians).
In this article, a ‘most different’ systems design was
chosen to explore the extent to which populist disinfor-
mation is constructed in similar ways in national settings
that differ on a number of relevant factors. Specifically,
we compare a bipartisan country (the US) to a multi-
party system with a minority coalition (the Netherlands)
to investigate whether the perseverance of partisan di-
vides shapes attributions of populist disinformation in
different ways. In addition, affective polarization along
partisan lines has mostly been associated with the US
(e.g., Iyengar & Hahn, 2009), whereas it is much less
central in public opinion, media, and politics in the
Netherlands. Finally, the presenceof right-wing populism
in US and Dutch politics differs. Although most literature
has reached consensus that the Dutch politician Geert
Wilders can be regarded as a (radical) right-wing populist
actor (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017), there has been less con-
sensus on whether Trump is a populist or radical right-
wing leader (Inglehart &Norris, 2016). Irrespective of the
different ways in which Trump has been classified, empir-
ical research confirmed that he communicates populist
and nativist worldviews (Hameleers, 2019). Again, this ar-
ticle aims to explore how similar populist disinformation
is constructed in different national settings. Across these
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national settings, we aim to arrive at a more comprehen-
sive understanding of how the media are cultivated as a
scapegoat in populist discourse. Therefore, the following
research question is introduced:
RQ1: How are references to the media as a scapegoat
for the people’s expressed in social media content in
the US and the Netherlands?
2.2. Populist Disinformation: The Resonance of Populism
with Fact-Free Communication
The second type of relationship between populism and
communicative untruthfulness proposed in this article—
populist misinformation—describes the resonance be-
tween populist styles of communication and the expres-
sion of fact-free sentiments that bypass expert knowl-
edge and empirical evidence. Among other things, the
style of populism has typically been regarded as people-
centric, conflict-focused, emotionalized, and based on
common sense and gut feelings (Ernst et al., 2019;
Hameleers et al., 2017; Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019).
Here, it should be emphasized that mis- and disinforma-
tion should not be conflated with the absence of factual
information and/or verified empirical evidence. Hence,
we argue that the circumvention of empirical evidence
and expert knowledge may give rise to the reliance of
a type of argumentation that relies on experiences and
opinions instead of verified information. As populism
shares a similar communication strategy (e.g., Aalberg
et al., 2017; Jagers &Walgrave, 2007; Krämer, 2014), the
second type of affinity between post-truth communica-
tion and populism should be regarded on the content
level: a preference for people-centric experiences over
hard facts and base rate information. Although this does
not mean that such type of information is necessarily
false, it does connect to a type of communication that de-
viates from journalistic principles that strive for the truth
(Waisbord, 2018): The people’s opinions and experiences
are less susceptible to verification and scrutiny than in-
formation presented as empirical evidence.
Populist communication bypasses the elites and ex-
perts as a source of knowledge and claims to give voice
to the ordinary people and their concerns (e.g., Krämer,
2014). These stylistic elements may give rise to a specific
type of communication that resonates with misinforma-
tion: Populist communication may present information
that is not based on empirical evidence and/or expert
opinion, but rather on the feelings and experiences of the
people. Here, it should be emphasized that such forms of
evidence-free communication are not necessarily wrong
or inaccurate. In fact, one of the role conceptions of jour-
nalism is to mobilize the public, and interpret issues by
establishing a link between events that happened and
the people on the streets. This means that giving a voice
to the people, and emphasizing their interpretations of
and connections to issues, is actually a focal part of qual-
ity journalism.
Situated in an era of post-factual relativism where
even the most basic facts that can be judged as false
or true are debated, (political) communication should at
least be founded on a true factual basis (e.g., van Aelst
et al., 2017). As an assessment of the normative impli-
cations an underpinnings of communication that avoids
facts whilst prioritizing the ordinary people’s lifeworld
reaches beyond the scope of this empirical endeavor,
this article aims to explore if, and if so, how, populist
communication actually gives rise to a communication
tactic that avoids verified empirical evidence and experts
whilst prioritizing conflict, emotions, and people’s experi-
ences. The research question that guides this focus reads
as follows:
RQ2: To what extent is populist communication used
to circumvent elitist knowledge and empirical evi-
dence whilst prioritizing experiences, conflict, and
people-centrism as the focal point of reality?
3. Method
To answer these research questions, this article re-
ports the result of two qualitative content analyses con-
ducted in the US and the Netherlands. The article ana-
lyzes direct communication via Twitter (politicians) and
Facebook (citizens). These two social media channels
are chosen for different reasons. Different social media
channels may correspond to different affordances (e.g.,
Valenzuela, Correa, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018). Twitter may
be used to acquire novel information, and can be used as
a one-directional communication channel where follow-
ers receive updates from connections that are not neces-
sarily reciprocal connections or ‘friends.’ Politicians fre-
quently use Twitter accounts as they can reach a large
number of followers, with whom they do not have to be
connected, which makes it a suitable platform for elitist
communication via weak-tie networks. Communication
among ordinary citizens on Facebook is more likely to
be based on strong-tie networks (e.g., Valenzuela et al.,
2018). However, politicians use Facebook in a differ-
ent way: they communicate their (personal and politi-
cal) viewpoints without necessarily interacting with their
followers. They do not personally know their followers,
and there is no reciprocity in the online exchanges. Yet,
Facebook may create a stronger perception of interactiv-
ity and community because citizens can respond to posts
by politicians and interact more directly with fellow citi-
zens that respond to the same original posts. Interaction
between users is afforded by both Twitter and Facebook,
but Facebook interactions typically allow for richer and
more detailed discussions and less elitist interactions
than the response sections offered by Twitter.
Based on these theoretical premises, data frompoliti-
cians’ Twitter accounts in the Netherlands and the US
were scraped. Here, two ‘most likely’ cases to express
populist attributions of blame were first of all selected:
Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Donald Trump
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in the US. To further explore if, and if so, to what ex-
tent, populist media critique, attributions of blame to
themedia, and the expression of populist disinformation
is a radical-ring wing populist phenomenon, these cases
were contrasted to the direct communication of left-wing
populist actors (Bernie Sanders in the US and the left-
socialist politician Emile Roemer of the Socialist Party
in the Netherlands) and mainstream politicians (Hillary
Clinton in the US and Mark Rutte in the Netherlands).
Even though not all scholars may agree on the classifi-
cation of Bernie Sanders and Emile Roemer as left-wing
populist, empirical evidence at least indicates that the
communication tactics of these actors at times align with
populist rhetoric. The key aim of case selection was to
test the theoretical premise that populist disinformation
mainly pertains to the radical right-wing, or whether it
can also be associated with the political communication
of left-wing populist and mainstream actors.
For the sample of Facebook communities used by or-
dinary citizens, the most-likely cases strategy was also
employed: Publicly accessible communities that revolves
around the native people and their distrust in the elites,
or nationalist pages more generally, were used to get
inductive insights into the construction of populist mis-
and disinformation.
3.1. Sample
The sample frame reflected key electoral events in both
countries: the national elections in the Netherlands and
the presidential elections in the US. In the Netherlands,
the most recent general elections were held on March
15, 2017. All original tweets by Geert Wilders in a two
months pre-election and a two months post-election pe-
riod were scraped (N = 1,065) and supplemented with
a routine period in 2016 and 2018. In the same period,
all 124 tweets of the left-wing politician Emile Roemer
and a sample of 558 tweets of the prime-minister were
selected. The key electoral event in the US took place
on November 8, 2016. In this country, the four-months
Twitter activity yielded 1,153 tweets by Donald Trump
(excluding non-relevant entries and retweets). This sam-
ple was extended with 603 tweets of Bernie Sanders and
405 tweets of Hillary Clinton. In the US, the same rou-
tine period as in the Dutch case was used for reasons
of comparability.
In each country, two publicly accessible Facebook
community pages that reflected radical-right wing issue
positions were sampled. In the Netherlands, these plat-
forms for example revolved around the theme of ‘getting
back the native people’s country’ and anti-immigration
sentiments. Similar authoritarian pages were sampled in
the US (one patriotist community page and one nativist
page was selected). Within these two communities, con-
tributions published in exactly the same timeframe as
the Twitter posts were sampled.
The sampling strategy on Facebook was two-staged.
More specifically, original posts had multiple replies
that contained relevant information connected to the re-
search question. Based on principles of maximum vari-
ation and saturation (e.g., Braun & Clarke, 2013; Glaser
& Strauss, 1967), ten original posts in each community
was found to be sufficient for saturation (meaning that
an additional sample of new posts did not yield addi-
tional findings). For every post, the first ten replies were
selected (ordered on date). Again, saturation was as-
sessed by coding additional replies after the first ten.
In some cases, the analysis of additional replies yielded
additional insights, which were included in the analysis.
Together, 20 posts and 215 replies were analyzed in the
Netherlands. 20 posts and 234 replies were analyzed in
the US. To contrast these pages to negative cases, we
added one left-wing community page in each country.
These pages mainly reflected an anti-corporation per-
spective, whilst articulating a more inclusive perspective
on the people (which is in contrast to the authoritarian
emphasis of the radical right-wing pages).
3.2. Analysis
All data were analyzed at the level of tweets, Facebook
posts, or replies. The Grounded Theory approach was
used to analyze the data in a step-by-step approach
(Braun & Clarke, 2013; Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss,
1967). The coding process was selective in the sense that
only excerpts that were relevant in light of the research
questions were coded. First of all, open coding was ap-
plied to label segments of tweets, Facebook posts, and
responses in light of the sensitizing concepts (i.e., discur-
sive constructions of truth, fake, misinformation, disin-
formation, populism). Here, it should be noted that the
coding process did not aim to classify information as mis-
and/or disinformation on the content level (which would
require fact-checking). Rather, we looked at how politi-
cians and citizens referred to information spread with-
out the intention to mislead (misinformation) or claims
that are deliberately untrue (disinformation). Further, we
looked at the type of argumentation used tomake claims
about reality: was empirical research quoted? Were ex-
pert analyses referred to? Did the politician or citizen
refer to experiences and common sense as argumenta-
tion/evidence for issue positions?
During the second step of focused coding, this exten-
sive list of codes (500+) was reduced by merging unique
open codes, reformulating codes to higher levels of ab-
straction, and raising codes to categories. Codes were
grouped and ordered based on their variety. In this pro-
cess, piles of codes related to the construction of truth,
the attribution of blame to (mainstream) media, false-
hoods, and populism were made. These groups were
used when conceptualizing dimensions that captured
variety in the concepts of interest. Finally, during the
step of axial coding, connections between these groups
were made. The research questions were guiding during
this final step of data reduction. More specifically, con-
structions of populism were connected to discourses of
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truth, reality, and disinformation. The outcomes of the
three-stage analysis strategy are depicted in a concept-
indicator-model (see Figure 1).
3.3. Validity and Reliability in Qualitative Text Analysis
It has been argued that the measures to ensure valid-
ity and reliability used in quantitative (content) analy-
ses are not suited to the completely different nature,
aims, and scope of qualitative (text) analysis (see e.g.,
Braun & Clarke, 2013). Responding to these different
demands, all steps of coding have been discussed with
a peer that was less involved in the study, but famil-
iar with qualitative text analysis. The raw data files of
25 tweets and 25 Facebook posts were also coded inde-
pendently by this second researcher. After this sample
was coded twice, differences in the labeling of segments
(open coding), the merging and grouping of codes (fo-
cused coding), and the conceptual connection between
emerging dimensions (axial coding) was discussed exten-
sively. Although minor differences in the allocation of
open codes and the subsequent process of data reduc-
tion were identified, the final core themes that emerged
from the raw data were similar, and resulted in the same
answers to the two research questions.
4. Results
4.1. How Right-Wing Populists Cultivate a Divide
between the Honest People and Lying Press
Both Trump and Wilders scapegoated the traditional
press for withholding the truth to the ordinary people.
The media, and mainstream media in particular, were
blamed for spreading lies that deprive the people of the
truth. This can be exemplified by one of Wilders’ tweets:
“Most of the media channels have just one aim: to hurt
meand the FreedomPartywith their lies. Fortunately,we
are stronger than the lies they are spreading” (Wilders,
2017b). Similar anti-media sentiments were expressed
by Trump: “Not only does the media give a platform to
hate groups, but the media turns a blind eye to the gang
violence on our streets!” (Trump, 2017c).
Evenmore explicitly, Trump (2017b) actively refers to
the cluster of media channels he distrust as the so-called
‘fake news’ media—which he regards as the greatest en-
emy of the American people: “The FAKE NEWS media
(failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN)
is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American
People!” References to the ‘danger to our country’ or
‘the American people’ explicate the discursive connec-
The media
deliberately spread
lies
The media as
enemy of the people
Hosle media
percepons: the
media are biased
Common sense
forms the basis of
the truth
Scapegoang the
media
Priorizing common
sense and the
people’s truth
Disinformaon in Populist
Discourse
Populist
disinformaon
Avoid empirical
evidence and
experts
The media spread fake
news by avoiding the
people’s reality
Fact-free arguments
that opposed source
and media are fake
Discredit and aack
elist sources of
knowledge
Figure 1. Concept-indicator-model depicting the structuring of populist disinformation on social networking sites.
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tion between populism and accusations of disinforma-
tion: Because the media are not reporting accurately on
the facts that happened, and as they deliberately dis-
tort the truth, the native people are threatened severely.
Wilders further emphasized the need to start a revolu-
tion to remove the elites in politics and media.
A further analysis of the discourse used to frame the
media as a culpable, elitist outsider reveals a clear dis-
tinction between mis—and disinformation. More specif-
ically, Trump’s and Wilders’ references to the media em-
phasize that the media’s dishonesty and inaccurate re-
porting is goal-directed and deliberate. As Trump (2017b)
puts it: “FAKE NEWS media knowingly doesn’t tell the
truth. A great danger to our country. The failing @ny-
times has become a joke. Likewise @CNN. Sad!” These
accusations of disinformation further point to an al-
leged political goal or hidden agenda of the news me-
dia: “Crooked Hillary colluded w/FBI and DOJ and me-
dia is covering up to protect her. It’s a #RiggedSystem!
Our country deserves better!” (Trump, 2016). According
to Trump, many news media outlets reside with op-
posed partisans. In this reading, these media outlets are
propaganda machines that promote and uncritically dis-
seminate the political agenda of the Democrats whilst
disregarding, attacking or strategically neglecting the
Republicans. Wilders further blames the media for self-
censorship, and for denying the ‘real’ problems facing
the nation: the Islam. As he puts it: “Fear and self-
censorship of the cowardmedia that ignores Islam as the
greatest danger to our nation” (Wilders, 2017a).
The references used by Trump and Wilders to de-
scribe the media climate further confirm the discursive
framing of an alleged climate of disinformation as a key
threat to the native people. Trump, for example, uses
adjectives as dishonest, rigged, dirty, crooked, and fake
to denote that the media are an enemy of the people.
Wilders refers to themedia as unworldly, disgusting, cow-
ards, or left-wing elitist. Here, it is important to note
that Trump is much more selective in attributing blame
to the media than Wilders. Whereas Wilders seems to
scapegoat the ‘news media’ as a whole, Trump (2017a)
clearly distinguishes between platforms that show a bias
against his political viewpoints and media platforms that
do report on the facts accurately: “The fake news media
is going crazy with their conspiracy theories and blind
hatred. @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable. @foxand-
friends is great!” Hence, channels that are in line with
Trump’s political agenda are credited, and incongruent
media are regarded as biased and blamed for their de-
liberate spread of dishonesty. For Wilders (2016), the di-
vide is mostly based on a cleavage between the people’s
reality and the distorted worldviews of the left-wing eli-
tist media: “A new all-time low for the left-wing media
scums. Disgusting!”
Contrasting the discursive constructions expressed
by the right-wing populist leaders to other political
actors, it can be confirmed that hostile media senti-
ments and accusations of disinformation do not spill
over to left-wing populists or the mainstream. In the
US, Bernie Sanders did not voice hostile media senti-
ments. Specifically, disinformation, ‘fake news,’ or re-
lated accusations were not addressed to the established
press or other sources of information. The discourses
of (un)truthfulness voiced by him did emphasize an
antagonism between the people’s reality and the lies
spread by his political opponent Trump (at least in the
pre-election period). In the pre- and post-election pe-
riod, Clinton did not explicitly engage in discourses of
(un)truthfulness. In the Dutch case, results are similar:
The left-wing populist politician Emile Roemer did not
voice anti-media sentiments, although he did empha-
size a divide between hard-working ordinary people and
corporate elites. Finally, the Dutch prime-minister Mark
Rutte did not engage in any populist or anti-media dis-
course. Taken together, our findings illustrate that attri-
butions of blame to the media, and using ‘fake news’ or
disinformation as a delegitimizing label, was restricted to
the direct communication of the two radical right-wing
populist leaders in our sample. Although left-wing pop-
ulists do stress a divide between the truth of the people
and lying political opponents, these reality constructions
reflect partisan and divides instead of blame attributions
to the (established) press.
4.2. A Populist Conception of Truth and Reality: The
People Know Best
The second type of relationship between populism and
discourses of mis- and disinformation conceptualized
in this article—populist disinformation—can be identi-
fied clearly in the direct communication of Trump and
Wilders. In the direct Twitter communication of both
Trump and Wilders, expert opinion is oftentimes ne-
glected and discredited,whereas the ordinary people are
regarded as the most reliable source of honest and ac-
curate information. In the Netherlands, Wilders (2018b)
frequently refers to common sense and the knowledge
of the ordinary people to disregard expert knowledge
on climate change, also referred to as “climate non-
sense” (Wilders, 2018b) by Wilders and his followers:
“Ordinary people confront the king with climate non-
sense of our cabinet. Where do people get 15,000 eu-
ros from?” Wilders (2018a) also cultivates a divide be-
tween the representation of left-wing elitist parties and
ordinary people represented by his Freedom Party: “The
Freedom Party represents all ordinary people despite
their color. The Greens only represent the white, left-
wing elites.”
Common sense is used to depict the truth, without
referring to any empirical evidence, numbers, or sources:
“What is sure is that the ordinary Dutch person can pay
for all this nonsense. The rest of it is based on lies and de-
ception” (Wilders, 2018d). This type of evidence that pri-
oritizes common sense and the ordinary people is used
to interpret any kind of issue, for example the (failing)
expenditures of the government:
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Electricity more expensive. VAT goes up. Rents higher.
But billions of euros go to Africa. The ordinary Dutch
people can bleed as a cause of the mistakes of the
gang of our governmental leader. Give these billions
to the hardworking Dutch citizens! (Wilders, 2018c)
Hence, hard claims, as well as causal connections that
resonate with a populist anti-elitist divide and threats to
the ordinary people, aremade without any references to
evidence, statistics, numbers, or expert opinion.
A similar discourse construction of reality can be
identified in Donald Trump’s populist expressions. Trump
(2018a) actively defends the political agenda he pur-
sues as the agenda governed by the common sense of
the American people: “Our agenda is NOT a partisan
agenda—it is the mainstream, common sense agenda of
the American People.” Moreover, Trump explicitly refers
to ‘facts’ and ‘the truth’ without giving any type of empir-
ical evidence to support these truths. In these references
to the truth and the centrality of the ordinary people, the
two types of relationships between accusations of disin-
formation and a populist framing of truth and reality of-
tentimes co-occur in single interpretations:
The Fake News hates me saying that they are the
Enemy of the People only because they know it’s
TRUE. I am providing a great service by explaining this
to the American People. They purposely cause great
division & distrust. They can also causeWar! They are
very dangerous & sick! (Trump, 2018b)
Cultivating the people’s truth is not restricted to the
discourse of radical right-wing populists. The left-wing
populist actors in our sample emphasized that ordi-
nary or native people are right, whereas elitist outsiders
(i.e., corporations) are breaking their promises by ly-
ing to the people. This can be illustrated by the follow-
ing tweet of Sanders (2016): “Time and again Native
Americans have seen the government break solemn
promises and corporations put profits ahead of their
sovereign rights.” Although people-centrism was less
central in Emile Roemer’s (2016) discourse, references
to the majority of the people and their will were implic-
itly articulated by the Dutch left-wing populist politician:
“The people know it—2/3 of all Dutch people agree with
the Socialist Party: we need to let the profiting billion-
aires pay!” Turning to themainstreampoliticians, Clinton
in the US and Mark Rutte in the Netherlands do identify
many references to the “American people” or “Dutch vot-
ers.” Yet, these references do not cultivate a cleavage be-
tween common-sense and people-centric realities con-
trasted to the elite’s lies.
4.3. The Audience’s Perception of a Cleavage Between
the Truthful ‘Us’ and Dishonest ‘Them’
Both types of relationships between populism and mis-
and disinformation identified in the Twitter communica-
tion of Trump and Wilders are confirmed with the ana-
lyses of the public’s discourse on Facebook. In this sec-
tion, only the differences between politicians’ reality con-
structions and citizens’ interpretations on the demand-
side will be discussed in more detail. In US public dis-
course, citizens made a less fine-grained distinction be-
tween trustworthy and rigged media outlets compared
to Trump. Hence, themedia, opposed partisans, and gov-
ernmental institutions were frequently lumped together
as an elitist outsider that did not comprehend the peo-
ple’s lifeworld: “Those that are white getting in trou-
ble for hate (racist) crimes and yet the far left commu-
nist Democrat controlled media never seem to report
these hate crimes against the whites” (Facebook user,
February 15, 2017). In the Netherlands, people mainly
attributed blame to the media elites for looking away, or
for being ‘blind’ to see the real problems and experiences
of the ordinary people: “They make sure that this is not
seen on TV. But the police is willing to join [protests ini-
tiated by the people]” (Facebook user, March 12, 2017).
In addition, Dutch citizens focalize an overall sense of dis-
trust in both themedia and expert knowledge: “They are
all shouting to tell exactly the same story. All the best
to them: there is no one who trusts media, students or
other so-called experts” (Facebook user, July 17, 2017).
The epistemic and moral boundary between the in-
nocent and honest ordinary people and the lying elites
wasmore salient on Facebook than reflected in the direct
communication of both politicians. Similar to politicians’
discourse, however, people refer to ‘the truth’ and ‘re-
ality’ without using empirical evidence or facts: “That’s
the truth. People with jobs don’t vote Democrat unless
they just don’t understand what goes on in this world”
(Facebook user, April 6, 2017). In the Netherlands, this di-
vide was further stressed by cultivating the divide along
ideological lines. The left-wing was regarded as dishon-
est and far-removed from reality, whereas the ‘real’ ordi-
nary people did knowwhat was going on in society: “Like
our Facebook page to show these left-wing idiots that re-
ported our previous page that we are right. They do not
want to see what is really going wrong here” (Facebook
user, August 8, 2017).
The analysis from the negative cases—the left-
oriented pages—reveal that people-centrism and a focus
on the common sense of the ordinary people is a com-
mon theme on these community pages as well. On these
pages, the reality constructions and lies of corporate and
political elites are contrasted to the ordinary people’s ex-
periences. Here, we see a left-wing populist construction
in which the hardworking ordinary citizen is juxtaposed
to the self-interested elites. Media critique is salient on
these pages as well, but it takes on less hostile forms.
See, for example, the following statement voiced on a
Dutch Facebook community: “The media do not report
accurately. They present a worldview that does not take
these factors into account” (Facebook user, September 8,
2017). Although the hostile media critique on the right-
wing populist pages may be considered as accusations
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of disinformation, the left-wing pages more closely re-
flected attributions of misinformation.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The alleged uncontrolled spread of dishonest or inac-
curate information in today’s fragmented media envi-
ronment may have severe political consequences (van
Aelst et al., 2017). More specifically, the epistemic sta-
tus of factual information increasingly becomes the fo-
cal point of heated debates, and the acceptance of in-
formation may be driven by defensive and consistency
motivations rather than veracity (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler,
2010). Extending this line of argumentation, this article
has proposed a two-fold relationship between populism
and mis- and disinformation: (1) the attribution of mis-
and disinformation to the (media) elites; and (2) pop-
ulist disinformation as a communication style that avoids
empirical evidence and expert analysis, whilst placing
common sense and the ordinary people at the center
stage of reality. Two qualitative content analyses in the
US and the Netherlands were conducted to provide in-
depth insights into the affinity between populism and
mis- and disinformation: How are social media platforms
providing a discursive opportunity for politicians and or-
dinary citizens to express populist boundaries between
the truthful us and the dishonest them?
First of all, we found that both Trump in the US and
Wilders in the Netherlands expressed a populist bound-
ary between the dishonest, inaccurate, and fake media
and ordinary native people that were victimized by the
media’s dishonesty. These attributions tie in with dis-
information: The media were accused of deliberately
distorting reality to promote their own biased politi-
cal agendas. The language used by both politicians fur-
ther indicate that the media are blamed for looking
away, and denying the problems experienced by the
ordinary people. There was one noteworthy difference
between Trump’s and Wilders’ anti-media discourse:
Wilders mostly attributed blame to the media in general,
whereas Trump more specifically blamed the media out-
lets that did not support his partisan views. This finding
can be interpreted as a stronger hostile media bias in the
US. Here,media outlets that expressed incongruent view-
points were regarded as biased against the views of the
people (e.g., Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985) and the truth
in general. Donald Trump thus selectively blamed and
credited sources to defend the partisan views he com-
municated to his followers. This finding can be explained
in light of the different media discourses at the time of
data collection. Althoughmost legacymediawere critical
towardWilders and his policies (i.e., there are at least no
clear indications that certain media were systematically
more favorable toward Wilders as compared to other
outlets), Trump could more clearly rely on the US parti-
san media system: Certain media may be explicitly nega-
tive in their coverage, whereas others may be systemati-
cally more favorable because of a political parallelism.
In support of the theoretical notion of the expres-
sion of fact-free and people centric-communication in
populist discourse (e.g., Waisbord, 2018), both politi-
cians clearly avoided expert knowledge, statistics, veri-
fiable facts or evidence, and relied on common sense
and the people’s truth as evidence for the populist claims
they made. There was little room for balance or oppos-
ing viewpoints, and the populist discourse was generally
one-sided and presented as the only reality opposed to
the ‘fake news’ presented by opposing politicians and
media sources. An important implication of these find-
ings is that social network sites, such as Twitter, provide
(populist) politicians with a platform to express disinfor-
mation to strategically attack the politicians they oppose.
This may eventually increase polarized divides in society,
and raise levels of political distrust and cynicism among
the electorate (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Explicit attacks
targeted at the news media were only found on the
radical-right, and did not spill over to the communication
tactics of left-wing populists or mainstream politicians in
the two countries. Left-wing populists did, however, em-
phasize people centrality and attributed dishonesty to
their political rivals and the (corporate) establishment.
Hence, discourses of untruthfulness can be connected
to populism in general, whereas the explicit reliance on
common sense and emotions as the focal point of real-
ity and blame attribution to the ‘lying’ established press
is a communication tactic of radical right-wing populists
in particular. In that sense, it seems that the authoritar-
ian element that sets right-wing populism apart from the
thin-cored ideology of populism (Mudde, 2007) can be
associated with hostile critique on the established press
and a circumvention of expert knowledge and empirical
evidence. But how is populist disinformation shaped by
the public on social media?
The content analysis of citizens’ discourse on
Facebook largely confirms the findings of the politicians’
discourse, pointing to an alignment of populist inter-
pretations between the supply and demand-side. The
difference mainly revolves around the type of moral
and epistemic cleavage emphasized by the public. More
specifically, Dutch citizens were more likely to cultivate a
divide between their in-group and the ignorant left-wing
people. In the US, the political and media elites were
frequently lumped together, whereas Trump articulated
a more fine-grained distinction between the ‘fake news’
media and politicians of the opposed party. The analysis
of the negative cases—left-wing oriented Facebook com-
munity pages—revealed that emphasizing the people’s
truth is not restricted to radical right-wing populist inter-
pretations. However, media critique was less hostile and
focused more on unintended false information (misin-
formation) than intentional deception (disinformation).
These findings indicate that citizens communicating their
political perspectives on different platforms do distin-
guish between attributions of mis- and disinformation.
Despite providing important new insights into how
mis- and disinformation can be situated in populist dis-
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course, this study has some limitations. First of all, the
empirical study only focused on two social media plat-
forms. Future research may extend the analysis to dif-
ferent platforms (i.e., including commentary sections of
mainstream outlets) and political actors (i.e., distinction
between populist and mainstream actors may be rele-
vant). Second, the qualitative and inductive findings pre-
sented in this article provided important first insights
into how populist disinformation manifests itself online,
but may be extended with (automated) content ana-
lytic research that also provides insights into the relative
salience of, and relationships between, different forms
of populist sentiments targeted at the media.
Despite these limitations, this article contributes to
our understanding of the current post-factual media era
and populist zeitgeist—and the interconnectedness of
these communicative phenomena—indicating in what
ways different actors can use social network sites to ex-
press a pervasive divide between the ‘honest’ people
and ‘the others.’
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